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The media greeted the handing down of the opinion in United States v. Jones
with exuberant fanfare. Technically, however, almost all the headlines reported its
holding inaccurately. In proclaiming that the "Supreme Court rules warrant
needed for GPS tracking" I or "Warrantless GPS tracking unconstitutional,
Supreme Court rules,"2 journalists missed one of the most interesting aspects of the
case. 3 Although the Justices did all agree that prolonged location tracking
infringed a Fourth Amendment interest, none of the three separate opinions
imposed a warrant requirement, and the concurrers even suggested that something
other than a traditional warrant might suffice.
Nevertheless, the press was right to celebrate. With United States v. Jones,4
the Supreme Court has at long last been dragged into the modem world (some
Justices kicking and screaming), and forced to confront the conflict inherent in
applying the rules of an analog Court to the actions of a digitalized police force.
To be sure, the Court has flirted with such recognition before: whether with Kyllo's
heat sensors, Ciraolo's airplanes,6 or even the Knotts and Karo beepers that were
Jones's predecessors. But in each of those cases, the Court resolved the issue on
the basic facts before it, resisting discussion of the new technology as any kind of
harbinger of a more constitutionally complex world.
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I Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court rules warrant needed for GPS tracking, USA TODAY, Jan.
24, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-01-23/supreme-court-
GPS/52754354/1.
2 Mike Sacks, Warrantless GPS Tracking Unconstitutional, Supreme Court Rules,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/23/warrantless-gps-
tracking-_n 1224000.html.
Tom Goldstein, of the highly respected SCOTUS blog, compiled a list of the major
erroneous print headlines from sources as diverse as The Los Angeles Times, the Associated Press,
and Reuters, some of whom also erred in the body of the story. Tom Goldstein, Jones confounds the
press, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p-137791.
4 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
s Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
6 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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With Jones, however, the new world order was inescapable. Shrugging off
the government's attempt to classify a month of uninterrupted GPS surveillance as
simply "mak[ing] observations of matters in public view,"7 every member of the
Court called it for what it was: a dossier of over "2,000 of pages of data"8 that
reported by latitude and longitude its subject's every movement over a four week
period. The concurring Justices even recognized that there was no way to compile
this information without technology; to do so would have exhausted the most
indefatigable of police forces.9 Jones therefore represents the Court's first overt
admission that technology has materially changed the nature of contemporary
policing, and by extension the relationship between the people and the state.
Enter the conundrum. Historically, the Court has couched the protections of
the Fourth Amendment in the language of privacy and property. Yet expectations
about freedom from government interference are no longer solely expressed in
those terms. People routinely trade their privacy or property interests for
complimentary e-mail services or faster toll crossings, and yet unfettered access to
such information strikes many observers as contrary to the Fourth Amendment's
core values. If neither privacy nor property theories provide a constitutional basis
for oversight, however, then what?
In Jones, the Justices were confronted with just this dilemma. In response, as
this Essay will show, roughly half of the Justices followed Justice Scalia into the
shelter of originalism. The other half, led by Justice Alito, ventured a bit more
boldly into the great unknown, but ultimately punted responsibility to a coordinate
branch. Only Justice Sotomayor made a first attempt at tackling the problem, but
she wrote alone. Regrettably, none of the opinions offered lasting guidance to
lower courts, much less to law enforcement actors. Nevertheless, this essay argues
that each is still notable for some aspect of what it conveys. It closes by
postulating that Jones is most interesting for what it didn't say-press reports
notwithstanding.
I. WHY THE MAJORITY WAS RIGHT
The most surprising thing about Justice Scalia's majority opinion is its mercy:
Katz survives with nary a scratch. In the past, Justice Scalia has expressed his
disdain for the test,"o even going so far as to suggest that Katz itself was wrongly
Brief for Petitioner at 22, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
9 132 S. Ct. at 948.
9 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
'0 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (criticizing the test as "subjective and unpredictable"); Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling it "fuzzy" and criticizing parties
for briefs that "give[] short shrift to the text of the Fourth Amendment").
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decided." But the Justice who famously ridiculed the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard unequivocally wrote in Jones that "the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test." 2 Of course, for criminal procedure scholars, most of whom had
long assumed property law a non-starter, the real headline for the Jones case might
thus have better read, "Two tests, not one, govern Fourth Amendment
applicability!" 13 That is why Justice Scalia had his work cut out for him.
Although he splices enough hairs to make it work in his opinion, the precedent that
he wrangles had fairly settled that property law no longer stood as a gateway to
Fourth Amendment protection. As the concurrence by Justice Alito ably pointed
out, the Court had repeatedly distanced itself from property and positive law as the
source of Fourth Amendment rights. After all, property rights feel equally
offended by the beepers installed in Knotts and Karo, or the trespass on the open
fields of Oliver, 14 but those cases all but overtly rejected positive law as a
determinant of the constitutional analysis.
Apart from its "disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law," 5
Justice Scalia's attachment to trespass as a means of deciding the Jones case
presented additional problems well summarized in Justice Alito's concurring
11 Fox News Sunday with Chris Wallace (Fox News television broadcast July 29, 2012),
transcript available at http://www.maggiestnotebook.com/2012/07/scotus-justice-antonin-scalia-full-
transcript-video-interview-7-29-12-rocket-launchers-privacy-arizona-illegals ("Look, the way the
Fourth Amendment reads is, the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizure. The first time my Court had a case involving wiretapping, it
said that's not covered by the Fourth Amendment. There can be state laws against it and most states
had laws, but it's not persons, houses, papers and effects. It's not covered by the Fourth Amendment.
The court reversed that, I don't know, 20 years later or so in a wave of non-originalism. Constitution
means what it ought to mean. Well, it simply doesn't cover that, which means that it's left to-it's
left to democratic choice, as most things are, even important things like abortion.").
12 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. The oral argument hinted as much. In formulating a property
rights based question, Justice Scalia previewed his ultimate position, asking,
Does-are you obtaining information that a person had a reasonable expectation to be
kept private? I think that was wrong. I don't think that was the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. But nonetheless it's been around for so long, we are not going to
overrule that. However, it is one thing to add that privacy concept to the Fourth
Amendment as it originally existed and it is quite something else to use that concept to
narrow the Fourth Amendment from what it originally meant.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 27 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
1 The reintroduction of trespass as a viable route to Fourth Amendment protection might, at
first glance, seem an exciting proposition. If the expectation of privacy is one that may derive from
"real or personal property law," Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95 1, then perhaps protections inhere in the many
forms of innovative entitlements found in contemporary property law. But the rest of the majority's
opinion seems very much tethered to an idea of property as frozen in the 180' century, not one that is
imagining broad new horizons.
14 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984).
'5 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959-61 (Alito, J., concurring).
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opinion. The majority's reasoning: "disregards what is really important,"16 leads to
"incongruous results,"1 7 creates opportunities for local variation in constitutional
protection, and either endorses superficial distinctions or leads to underprotection
of rights if non-physical intrusions are left uncovered. The concurrence's dismay
is palpable in the opinion's opening sentences, which jab at the majority's
"reliance on 18' century tort law" to resolve questions about a "21s' century
surveillance technique."' 9 In other words, only a justice inclined to worry about
the privacy of the lady of the house during her evening sauna could unblinkingly
conjure "a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both"20 in order to make the
laws of 1789 comport with technologies of year 2012.
The concurrence has the better of the argument on all four of its points, and
woe to the generation of law students that will now struggle with the idea that the
Fourth Amendment "trespass" test applies to a beeper attached by police, while its
"expectation of privacy" test governs a beeper installed by the dealership. Woe
also to the criminal proceduralists who may need to relearn the right of replevin in
order to answer hypotheticals about a guy who gives a ride to his buddy, who turns
out to be an undercover cop, whose GPS enabled cell phone conveniently gets
"lost" under the front seat. For that reason alone the concurrence has it right that it
was nothing more than accident that conventional property rights could resolve this
case, and accident is a bad basis upon which to make constitutional law.
And yet. Right as Alito may be to mock the majority's reliance on property
law, Justice Scalia is not completely wrong. Consider the case of one animal rights
activist who found a device surreptitiously attached to her car. 2 1 After carrying it
around for a week, afraid to alert law enforcement that she had learned of its
existence, she had her lawyer contact the FBI. They asked for it back, brazenly
asserting that it was their property. The same thing happened to a young Arab-
American student, Yasir Afifi. 22 In 2010, a routine oil change revealed that a
16 Id. at 961 (snidely noting that the Court "instead attaches great significance to something
that most would view as relatively minor. . . . ").
1 Id. (noting that, on this reading, the Constitution would allow the same information to be
obtained through aerial surveillance).
1 Id. at 962.
1 Id at 957.
20 Id. at 959 n.3 (responding to the majority's claim that the GPS unit was akin to a
"constable's concealing himself in the target's coach in order to track his movements"). The sauna
image was summoned by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27,
38 (2001).
21 Ian Herbert, Where Are We with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442,455-60
(2011).
22 Afifi is represented in his lawsuit against the government by lawyers for the Council on
American-Islamic Relations, who filed an amicus brief for Respondent in the Jones case. Brief for
the Council on American-Islamic Relations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
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strange looking device had been attached to his car. A friend of Afifi's posted
pictures of the device on a popular website, and commentators identified it as a
GPS tracker. Agents of the FBI then showed up at his apartment, demanding that
he return the tracker and take down the website.23
To be sure, the most troubling aspect of these stories is the unchecked nature
of the surveillance, but they also touch on something primitive about the nature of
property. It just feels wrong that the government surreptitiously installed the
thing, and then had the gall to demand it back. To be fair, the government's
argument is not wholly indefensible-these devices can be expensive, and they do
contain proprietary technology that the government has an interest in not seeing
deconstructed on a public website. But it is also deeply offensive-how dare the
police sneak something onto your property and then assert a right to reclaim it?
The physical intrusion is even more insulting when you consider that some
location trackers require investigators to return to the device to charge it or collect
24data. It is one thing to stick a device on someone's car, but it feels a degree more
invasive to go back to it every four days to switch out the batteries. Property may
be the wrong lens, but that does not necessarily mean it is not a little bit right-
there may still be a reason why possession is said to be nine-tenths of the law.
The aftertaste of property that remains after chewing on privacy rights leads
to another interesting aspect of the majority's opinion. As we all know, the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable "searches and seizures." Most
constitutional doctrine does not take pains to delineate which of the two interests
are at stake in a given case: when police rifle through a bag, courts usually do not
linger over whether the problem was the seizure of the bag or the search. Indeed,
apart from seizures of persons, there is relative seamlessness between the "search"
lines of analysis and the "seizure" lines, both of which have historically been
triggered by the same basic Katz requirement.
But Justice Scalia in his opinion specifically distinguishes the tracking as an
illicit "search," 25 rather than seizure. Normally, this would not signify much, but
the majority's desire to resuscitate trespass theory required it to distinguish Karo's
seemingly unambiguous statement that "an actual trespass is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation." 26 Accordingly, the Court does so
by clarifying that "Karo was considering whether a seizure occurred, and . . . a
seizure of property occurs not when there is a trespass, but when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property."27
23 See generally Herbert, supra note 21, at 455-60 (reciting facts of several cases).
24 Id. at 485.
25 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
26 Id. at 951 (quoting the concurrence quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713
(1984)).
27 Id. (emphasis added). This is consistent with the majority's take on Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992), which held that law enforcement infringed a constitutional interest when they
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In other words, Karo was not a case about police following someone around
using surreptitious technology, it was just a case about seizing canisters by means
of beeper insertion. Thanks to Jones, we now know that a seizure requires a
meaningful interference with property rights, whereas a search occurs whenever an
expectation of privacy has been invaded, either regardless of property rights (pure
Katz social norms) or via even a trivial impingement on property (Jones trespass).
This lesson might be the criminal procedure scholar's second real headline:
"Search and seizure of property apparently governed by (slightly) different
tests!"28
As the concurrence observes, however, the problem with tying the concept of
"search" to trespass is that it comes perilously close to rendering every installation
of a tracking device or minor infringement on property interests a constitutional
violation. The majority anticipates this issue, and explains that "[t]respass alone
does not qualify . .. there must be . . . an attempt to find something or to obtain
information."29 But the concurrers are right to resist their explication, although
they give the wrong reasons. The concurrers' quibble is that the rationale "is
dependent on the questionable proposition that [installation and use of the device]
cannot be separated for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis." 30 In other
words, because simply attaching the device is not alone seizure (as it only
minimally infringes a property right), and because receiving the data from the
device is not alone search (because that requires no trespass, and offends no
expectation of privacy), it is only by pasting both actions together that an illicit
"search" can be created.
But contrary to the concurrers' suggestion that there is something illegitimate
about amalgamating the actions in this way, in general this kind of comprehensive
assessment is a positive development that will hopefully gain traction in future
cases. The majority focused on the installation of the device as a way of rendering
the act of using it illegitimate, but Fourth Amendment law would also benefit from
thinking the same way in reverse: the use of information might be enough to render
its acquisition unlawful. Current Fourth Amendment law emphasizes acquisition:
how did the police acquire the DNA sample or financial record or biometric
removed a trailer home, because even though the owners' privacy was not invaded, their property
rights were. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951.
28 There is some precedent for such determined parsing of constitutional categories.
Specifically, Justice Scalia's majority opinion in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622 (1991)
suggested that the constitutional standard for a seizure of the person required application of physical
force (or, possibly, a submission to a show of authority), even while acknowledging that, under Katz,
a seizure of effects (a telephone conversation) could be effectuated through non-physical means. Id.
at 627 & n.3. I am grateful to Stephen Schulhofer for highlighting this point, which he notes in his
book was a distinction drawn without explanation, and which he rightly decries as "artificial."
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 89-90 (2012).
29 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.
3o Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
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image? It cares little for what happens next-to what use that information is put.
Suggesting that the constitutional standard might embrace greater complexities-
allowing some usages of lawfully obtained information but disallowing others, or
shutting down some unseemly ways of getting even publicly available information
as improper-is to my lights a good thing.
That is not to say that the majority's reasoning closes more doors than it
opens. In Jones, the device was installed and monitored by law enforcement. But
what if it were installed by the police but never activated?3' Or installed by a third
party (like OnStar), but activated by law enforcement? Or both installed and
activated by a third party, but monitored by law enforcement? Is the scope of the
traditional Katz test in such a situation commensurate with the scope of Jones's
revived trespass test, or does the added offense of the trespass make prolonged
surveillance cross a constitutional line from which an invasion of privacy realized
without any trespass would stay clear? In other words, if the majority thinks the
real wrong of Jones is the installing and the watching, then is just the watching
alone going to be enough to trigger traditional Katz recognition? Based only on
the majority opinion, we cannot say.32
II. WHY THE ALITO CONCURRERS WERE RIGHT
The previous section explains why the concurrers should have paused a
moment before justifiably bursting out laughing when the majority shouted
trespass. But does that mean the Alito concurrers should be immune from
criticism themselves? Because the majority holding is not trespass-only, but rather
is trespass-plus-Katz, Justice Scalia spends his time defending the "plus"
formulation rather than simply attacking the concurrence's Katz test. This is no
surprise-why should the majority spill ink to criticize a test that it concedes it
may turn to in future cases? 33
And, to be sure, Katz can get the job done. Justice Alito is right to chide the
majority for harkening back to the Founders, given that "it is almost impossible to
think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous" to Jones's month of
3' Even though the device would not generate any evidence suppressible in a criminal case,
such a question might be relevant for a section 1983 suit.
32 Justice Scalia tells us only that "the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it
is achieved by such a trespass or invasion ofprivacy," Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5 (emphasis added),
which on its face suggests the difference lies entirely in the how: if a remote tracker is as much an
invasion of privacy as an installed tracker is a trespass, then the Constitution is violated. However,
whereas a minor trespass such as that in Jones was enough to trigger constitutional protection when
coupled with the invasion of privacy that occurred from the ensuing surveillance, it is not at all clear
that a minor invasion of privacy from nontrespassory action would also be enough even when
coupled with the same degree of ensuing surveillance.
33 Id. at 953 ("Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.").
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satellite surveillance. 34 Surely an analysis based on something other than property
rights is warranted. Justice Alito is also right to liken the majority's dependence
on physical concepts to the discredited approach associated with the cases on
wiretapping.3 5 Justice Alito proffers that history as evidence of the death of
trespass theory, but its real import may be to remind everyone that the Constitution
(and its spokesperson, the Court) is widely considered to have faltered during its
first brushes with 21s' century technology by stubbornly clinging to property law.
Moreover, a Katzian concept of "privacy" is an important one that most
people probably do associate with the Fourth Amendment-perhaps not privacy
the way the Court has precisely conceived of it, but certainly some idea of non-
interference from the government. If so, then that further insulates the concurrers
from the criticism that they are relying on a nebulous test. After all, however
poorly defined in the abstract, the core of a "non-interference" interest surely
encompasses the police surreptitiously sticking a device on your car that will report
your location for eternity.
So, viva Katz? Not necessarily. If Justice Scalia were to, be justified in
laughing at the concurrers, it would be at the continued effort to pass off the Katz
test as the rule of law rather than ad hoc judicial discretionary decision-making.
There is a reason the Katz test has become the bugbear of courts and academics
alike. As the concurrers conceded, "[i]t involves a degree of circularity, and
judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks."36 In this respect,
"expectation of privacy" can operate less like a test and more like a label that is
attached after the fact and that simply signals membership in a particular camp of
ideas about the proper reach of government-like calling sparkling wine
champagne or prosecco.
The greatest disappointment of the concurring opinion, therefore, is its refusal
to even attempt a theory of Fourth Amendment applicability that would have
buttressed the same ultimate holding, but with a test that might apply beyond the
particular facts of this case. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the opinion below
deftly articulated a "mosaic theory," observing that "the whole of one's
movements is not exposed constructively even though each individual movement is
exposed, because that whole reveals more-sometimes a great deal more-than
does the sum of its parts."3 One might easily extrapolate from this reasoning a
principle by which comprehensive or prolonged compilations of data might receive
Fourth Amendment protection. It might beneficially apply in cases involving data
34 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
3 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court gave a colorful
example: "a single trip to a gynecologist's office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a
few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story." Id. at 562.
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mining, or public cameras, or other new technologies that similarly press the limits
of constitutional tolerance.
Yet the Alito concurrers do not so much as mention the word "mosaic." The
closest acknowledgment is almost a rebuke.38  In reproaching the majority's
property law theory, Justice Alito references a nugget of something akin to mosaic
theory-the idea that the constituent pieces of a police activity might each
independently pass constitutional muster, yet fail when considered together.39 But
Justice Alito's intent is to disparage Justice Scalia's rationalizations, not to endorse
a new constitutional approach.
Rather, and in contrast to the valuable insights offered by the D.C. Circuit, the
Alito concurrers mechanically apply the Katz test in four unhelpful steps that
effectively underscore its subjectivity. Namely, they: 1) acknowledge that
technology upsets conventional understandings of privacy; 2) give an intriguing
and long overdue nod to the fact that technology removes practical constraints that
have historically cabined police intrusiveness; 40 3) offer a quick canvas of the state
legislative efforts in this area that turns up little activity; and 4) abruptly conclude
that long term monitoring qualifies for Fourth Amendment protection (although
"we need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle
became a search"). Hardly the kind of guidance for which lower courts and law
enforcement actors confronted with questions about e-mail and cell site tracking
and other new technologies-not to mention three week long GPS surveillance-
have been clamoring.
III. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR STANDS ALONE
So if property feels mostly wrong but a little bit right, and expectation-of-
privacy feels mostly right but effectively arbitrary, where does that leave the
Fourth Amendment? Relatedly, where does that leave Justice Sotomayor? She
clearly agrees with much of the majority and of the concurrers: the Fourth
38 Justice Sotomayor, in contrast, comes a bit closer by at least "ask[ing] whether people
[would] reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that
enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
40 Justice Alito made a similar point during oral argument, remarking that
[T]he heart of the problem that's presented by this case and will be presented by other
cases involving new technology is that in the pre-computer, pre-Intemet age, much of the
privacy-I would say most of the privacy-that people enjoyed was not the result of
legal protections or constitutional protections; it was the result simply of the difficulty of
traveling around and gathering up information.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011) (No. 10-1259).
The same theme was echoed by Justice Sotomayor in her opinion. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that
constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and community hostility."').
3332012]
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Amendment is trespass-plus-Katz, and technology poses a special problem. So
why does she write alone? As the critical fifth vote to make the majority, her
views may provide the best basis on which to resolve the first two thoughts raised
by reading Jones: "Does trespassory short-term GPS tracking activity also impinge
on a constitutional interest?" and "How does Jones apply to prolonged non-
trespassory surveillance technologies?"
With regard to the first issue, Justice Sotomayor alone intimates that "even
short-term monitoring" using GPS tracking might invoke constitutional scrutiny.41
Interestingly, her reasoning appears to rest less on the trespassory act than on her
fundamental discomfort with the revealing nature of GPS monitoring. In contrast,
the majority inexplicably avoids the topic-under a conventional trespass-based
approach it seems that it should equally offend the Constitution, but Justice
Scalia's trespass-as-search logic may leave room for short-term monitoring not to
provide enough offense to privacy to vault it to constitutional stature. The Alito
concurrence requires no parsing: it expressly states that short term monitoring
would not raise Fourth Amendment issues. 42 Accordingly, the writing on the wall,
while admittedly ambiguous, seems to suggest that even GPS-based short-term
surveillance may remain unregulated.
The more troubling question relates to the use of prolonged GPS tracking
conducted via a nontrespassory method of surveillance-say, tapping into a
person's cell phone or tuning into a vehicle's pre-installed OnStar system. It is
clear that the Alito concurrers would find the lack of a physical intrusion
immaterial. In contrast, by relying solely on trespass, the majority is able to leave
for another day the applicability of a Katz-only analysis to a situation that did not
involve invasion of a property right.43 Based on Justice Scalia's prior statements, it
is possible that he does not think such action would implicate the Fourth
Amendment"-a view of the majority opinion shared by the Alito concurrers,45
41 Of course, the question may somewhat be moot, inasmuch as short-term monitoring may
more readily be conducted using technology like that presented in Karo and Knotts, or through
nontrespassory means.
42 Cf Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a
person's movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable.").
43 Id. at 953 ("Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis"); id. at 954 ("It may be that achieving the same result
through electronic means, without accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,
but the present case does not require us to answer that question.").
4 See also supra note 32. Some might argue that Scalia's position in Kyllo-that use of a
heat sensor on the walls of a home constituted an invasion of privacy-proves that he would likely
consider a nontrespassory prolonged investigation a "search." But Kyllo might be distinguished in
that it entailed surveillance of the home-a constitutionally sacrosanct place-thereby exacerbating
the "trespass" aspect of the analysis, and revealed information he deemed in no way exposed to the
public, thereby exacerbating the "obtaining of information" aspect. In contrast, automobiles searches
are routinely exempted from the warrant requirement, and their movements are typically public to
some degree. It is also significant that of the Justices in the Jones majority, only Thomas joined
Scalia in Kyllo; Justice Kennedy dissented and Justice Roberts was not yet on the bench.
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and possibly by Justice Sotomayor herself.46 In fact, the position of the Justices in
the majority as to this question was sufficiently ambiguous that Justice Sotomayor
felt it necessary to send a very clear signal to lower court judges (at least, those
who can count) that: "I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, 'longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy"' even when done with "nontrespassory surveillance techniques."4
Of course, that sounds so close to what the concurrers wrote that it may imply
an easy majority (Justice Sotomayor plus the Alito concurrers) to hold that Katz is
violated by a nontrespassory version of what the government attempted in the
Jones case. That was the lesson that I took away after my first encounter with the
opinion, but upon further reflection, there may be subtle distinctions between the
two concurring opinions-between Justice Alito's basic Katz and Sotomayor's
vision of Katz-plus, that suggest that outcome is not as predetermined as it may
seem.
For instance, the Alito concurring Justices agree that "the availability and use
of [modem devices] will continue to shape the average person's expectations about
the privacy of his or her daily movements." Given the ubiquity of GPS enabled
mobile phones and FourSquare "check-ins," it may therefore be much easier to
evade constitutional review with a nontrespassory surveillance method than at first
glance appeared. 4 This view is underscored by Justice Alito's apparent
willingness to barter constitutional protection: "[n]ew technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile." 49 In other words, if Katz is only about privacy, and
people choose to capitalize on the convenience of EZ-Pass even though they know
it creates a record of their toll crossings, then Katz will not protect them. In this
respect, there is an irony to Justice Alito's mockery of Justice Scalia for his narrow
and misguided focus on property interests, given that his own opinion tenders such
a cramped notion of constitutional privacy that it takes nothing more than
switching on one's cellphone to obliterate it.
In contrast, Justice Sotomayor appears willing to wholly reimagine doctrine
that would honor the Fourth Amendment's purpose while remaining compatible
with modem life. She is the only Justice to mention-albeit obliquely-the First
Amendment associational and speech interests that often move in tandem with
45 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring) (highlighting that the Court's approach
would find prolonged surveillance conducted through nontrespassory means "not subject to any
Fourth Amendment constraints").
46 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("In cases of electronic or other novel modes of
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion's
trespassory test may provide little guidance.").
47 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 962 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Fourth Amendment values.so She is the only Justice to suggest that constitutional
privacy should not be equated with secrecy.51 She openly calls out the "third party
doctrine," suggesting that the Court "reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties."52 And she beefs with Justice Alito's willingness to trade constitutional
protection for "convenience or security."53 In short, her opinion is the only one
that contains any trace of vision, even as she admits to struggling with how
precisely to realize it.
IV. WHY JONES REALLY MATTERS
Tracking the Katz (Alito), Katz-plus (majority) and super-Katz (Sotomayor)
positions in the Fourth Amendment trigger debate is entertaining, but the ultimate
holding in Jones-the unanimous agreement that the Fourth Amendment applies to
prolonged location tracking via an attached GPS device-is not actually the case's
most interesting feature. Instead, the most compelling parts of the opinions all
relate to the same technical aspect of the case that so confounded the press. Given
that nine Justices agree that the Fourth Amendment applies to location tracking,
what is required for police to engage in it? Jones proffers four interesting insights
along these lines that have largely gone unremarked.
First, it is significant, although certainly not surprising, that no party nor
amicus, much less any Justice, entertained the position that prolonged GPS
tracking should simply not be allowed. In this age of taking our shoes off at the
airport or showing our purse contents at sporting events, it is apparently beyond
dispute that the police should have access to this information-it is simply a
question of how many hurdles they should have to jump. Contrast that expectation
to the initial reception to wiretapping technology. In the 1920s, the Attorney
General and FBI renounced wiretaps as "unethical," 54 and as late as 1967 President
Johnson denounced wiretaps for domestic policing in his State of the Union
address.55 Yet even in a non-election year, the idea of President Obama proposing
50 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
51 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
52 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("Perhaps, as Justice Alito notes, some people may
find the 'tradeoff of privacy for convenience 'worthwhile,' or come to accept this 'diminution of
privacy' as 'inevitable,' and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people would accept [it] without
complaint ..... (internal citation omitted)).
54 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 200 (1966).
ss President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 10, 1967) ("We should outlaw all wiretapping-public and private-wherever and whenever it
occurs, except when the security of this Nation itself is at stake-and only then with the strictest
governmental safeguards. And we should exercise the full reach of our constitutional powers to
outlaw electronic 'bugging' and 'snooping."').
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to outlaw police GPS monitoring seems unfathomable. This may be a comment on
the ubiquity of technology in our life-we can no longer imagine cutting off law
enforcement from such a fertile source of information. Or, more alarmingly, it
may be a comment on ubiquity of law enforcement-we can no longer imagine
any truly private sphere.
Second, a majority of the Justices appear willing to explore the idea that the
Fourth Amendment need not be trans-substantive. That is, contemporary Fourth
Amendment doctrine is, at least on the surface, offense-neutral. If a warrant is
required, it is required whether the officer suspects that the offender committed a
murder or a petty theft. But five Justices in Jones signed off on the idea that this
need not be the case. Justice Alito closed his opinion noting that "[w]e need not
consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investigations
involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitutionally
protected sphere of privacy,"5 and in her statement of agreement with Justice Alito
that long term monitoring impinges expectations of privacy, Justice Sotomayor
qualified her statement as applicable to "most offenses."5 Although these brief
comments by no means espouse a new theory of the Fourth Amendment, they do
evince a willingness to consider adjusting the scope of protection according to the
offense being investigated. That alone is revolutionary, as Justice Scalia testily
pointed out. 58
Logistically, Justices Alito and Sotomayor's statements are confusing in that
they suggest that the nature of the offense may calibrate the availability of Fourth
Amendment protection (the protected interest question), as opposed to vary the
procedural device necessary for the police to gain access (the warrant question).
By way of comparison, it seems both more natural and more reasonable to hold
that all long-term GPS tracking triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny, but that
police may satisfy constitutional requirements more readily when investigating a
terrorist than when investigating a petty thief. In contrast, the language of the
concurrers suggests that the alleged terrorist has fewer protected interests than the
thief, instead of the same interests less strenuously defended.
Third, contrary to the headlines, none of the three opinions stated that a
warrant was the only means of satisfying the Fourth Amendment. The opinions of
56 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
57 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I agree with Justice Alito that, at the
very least, 'longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations
of privacy.").
5 Justice Scalia testily noted as much, remarking that "[t]here is no precedent for the
proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being
investigated." Id. at 954. Ironically, Gant-the holding of which embraced a position promoted by
Justice Scalia-might be considered a stepping stone to this notion, inasmuch as the Court held that
the nature of the offense of arrest should limit the scope of the search permissibly undertaken by
officers. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 353 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (limiting searches
incident to arrest in an automobile to situations of actual danger or suspicion that the vehicle contains
evidence relating to the offense of arrest).
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Justices Alito and Sotomayor might even be read to advise that it is not: both
intimate that oversight by a coordinate branch would alleviate some of the
constitutional problems, without stating that a warrant would be a necessary floor.
Even the majority opinion, authored by the Justice Most Likely to Require a
Warrant, 9 ultimately ducked the question, noting that the government forfeited its
argument that the warrantless search was lawful. 60 Nevertheless, the majority still
took pains to admonish that law enforcement may "always seek a warrant" 61 in
response to the concurrence's complaint that the opinion bred uncertainty,
suggesting that warrants were at least to some degree on the brain.
That the warrant question might remain open at all is a strong statement of
how far the Court has drifted from its first deviation in Terry. Reasonableness
used to be populated chiefly by two main threads of cases: stop-and-frisk and
suspicionless searches that required a "special need."62 In Samson v. California,
however, the Court seemed to push these boundaries by holding that targeted
suspicionless searches for a law enforcement purpose were constitutionally
permissible. The reasoning-that parolees and probationers held conditional
liberty that diminished their privacy entitlements under the Constitution-seemed
dangerous but easily distinguishable. But if Jones is a signal that the Court might
approve a legislative scheme that provides for surveillance according to standards
less than probable cause and without particularity, then it constitutes a radical shift.
That is, although the Supreme Court has not yet overtly accepted the notion that
the "reasonableness" clause might approve full-blown warrantless searches
targeted to a particular person for ordinary law enforcement purposes, Jones may
prove that the Court has not rejected it, either.
Last, and perhaps most intriguingly of all, a majority of Justices agreed that
the whole mess might better be left to legislative bodies to figure out. Adopting a
59 I say this because Justice Scalia is: 1) an avowed originalist unlikely to stray too far from
the constitutional text; 2) the author of Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), which imposed a
warrant requirement for heat sensors; and 3) the Justice who chastised his colleagues for endorsing a
cautious and incrementalist approach to resolving questions involving new technologies, stating "the
times-they-are-a-changing is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty." City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon,
130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The
Court's implication that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we
otherwise would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private
action)-or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque
opinions-is in my view indefensible."). That said, Justice Scalia did embrace an interpretation of the
Amendment that allows for "reasonableness" in place of a strict warrant standard. See California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) ("[The] supposed 'general rule' that a warrant is always
required does not appear to have any basis in the common law.").
60 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
61 Id.
62 Of course, there are also occasional odd cases about administrative warrants, but they were
doctrinally atypical.
6 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
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position that is most associated with Professor Orin Kerr,64 whom he cites, Justice
Alito declared that "[a] legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way."65 Justice Sotomayor's endorsement was more tentative. In
cautioning against "entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight
from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse,"66 she left open the
possibility that such supervision might stem from legislative, rather than judicial,
action.
Both references bolster the claim that the concurrers' failure to impose any
warrant requirement may be because the Court wishes to encourage the legislatures
to come up with their own guidelines, which plausibly might allow some lesser
showing. But from the opinions alone, it is hard to gauge just how serious the
Justices are in their exhortation. By offering no more than conclusory statements
about the merits of democratic decision-making, the Justices certainly provide little
hope that the Court will assume a robust role in defending constitutional values.
Nor do their passing remarks provide much guidance to legislatures who choose to
take up their challenge.
As I have written elsewhere, the Court is right to look to legislatures for help67in sorting through the challenges of policing with new technologies. The warrant
can be too blunt an instrument for the sensitive issues raised by modem
investigative tools. A warrant unlocks the door guarding the individual's privacy
and effectively turns away; legislative rules, in contrast, can monitor. They can
dictate standards for proper mainentance, search and timely disposal of records;
require training, recordkeeping or reports about law enforcement behavior; and
enforce other protections tailored to the specific technology at issue.
At the same time, it would be wrong for the judiciary to cite these advantages
as a justification for abdicating its primary role as defender of the Constitution.
Too many public choice problems attend efforts to legislate in this area to entrust
Fourth Amendment rights wholly to the democratic processes. Moreover, the
Court has both a political and moral obligation to fulfill its role as a co-equal
6 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004).
65 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
67 make this argument more directly in two places: first, in a position paper co-authored with
Professor Peter Swire, in which we lay out our vision for this mode of constitutional adjudication.
See Peter Swire & Erin Murphy, How to Address "Standardless Discretion" After Jones (Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 177, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2122941. I also make it in a forthcoming article
that scrutinizes the privacy enactments actually promulgated by the United States Congress. See Erin
Murphy, The Politics ofPrivacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, The Fourth
Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), draft
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=2021439.
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branch commissioned with the interpretation and defense of our constitutional
rights.
Rather than defer entirely to the political branches, then, a better approach is
one that uses judicial review to focus legislatures on the promulgation of
procedural safeguards against abuse, and the assurance of actual police compliance
with announced rules. To conduct this kind of review, the Court at the very least
must demand that law enforcement improve its documentation and internal
assessments of its own policies and activities. To take one easy target, the
government's claim that "[f]aw enforcement has not abused GPS technology. No
evidence exists of widespread, suspicionless GPS monitoring, and practical
considerations make that prospect remote,"6 calls to mind the old adage "absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence." Constitutional review that asks the
government to back up such claims with evidence-say, documentation of detailed
internal standards for engaging in GPS monitoring, coupled with quality assurance
reports about the frequency, duration, and success of its efforts-has the potential
to protect rights much more meaningfully than even a blanket warrant requirement.
V. SUM
As a matter of primitive Court watching, Jones is a testament to the strange
bedfellows often found in Fourth Amendment cases. The briefs of the amici (of
which all but one was submitted on behalf of the respondent) paint a revealing
picture: the ACLU, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy
Information Center predictably all argued against the government, but so too did
the Rutherford Institute, the Cato Institute, and a consortium of gun and libertarian
interest groups. Two prominent court conservatives argued divergent positions,
each bridged by Justice Sotomayor, one of the more liberal members of the Court.
From one step removed, it is hard to determine what the next case will hold;
not the one that asks whether nontrespassory surveillance infringes a Fourth
Amendment interest, but the one that asks whether a warrant is the constitutional
requirement for engaging in prolonged tracking. In any case, my own prediction is
that Justice Sotomayor's opinion, not unlike the concurring opinion by Justice
Harlan that ended up setting the Katz standard, endures as the first visionary
proclamation of how to manage the challenges that future cases are likely to
present.
68 Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
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